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Measuring Compliance: Social Rights and 







This article argues that since fulfilment of social rights is dependent on the availability of 
resources we must look beyond the field of international human rights, to economics, to 
provide a stylised way of thinking about measuring compliance. Using conditional rights as 
a starting point, the article argues that there are certain normative and practical factors that 
limit social rights and it is in allowing for these factors that gives rise to the maximum 
resources dilemma: how can the content of social rights be determined if it is allowed to 
differ across resource contexts, and how can compliance be measured if the content is not 
determinate? It argues further that the empirical tools of microeconomics offer a 
systematic way to deal with the dilemma and outlines a methodological sketch for 




I.         INTRODUCTION 
Consider two new lives. The first enters the world in Swaziland, the other in Switzerland. The 
Swazi new born is twenty times more likely to die before reaching her fifth birthday than her 
Swiss counterpart.1 If she lives to school age, she will be educated for half the number of years.2 
She is twenty-eight times more likely to suffer from hunger.3 Overall, being born in Swaziland 
means she can expect to live thirty fewer years than if she was born in Switzerland and the cause 
from which she will eventually die most likely could otherwise have been avoided.4 
 
On witnessing the real life tragedy of those around the world living without shelter, without 
access to education and at risk of early mortality, it might seem reasonable to say that a violation 
of human rights has occurred.5 But, whilst framing life and death tragedies within the notion of 
rights leads one to hope that some improvement to the ill-fated situation could be made, the 
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mere labelling of unsatisfied social need as a violation of human rights is unsatisfactory. Social 
rights are dependent on the availability of resources.6 And, given that the capacities of different 
countries vary in significant ways, the expectation that some countries have a duty to deliver the 
same standard of health, nutrition, education, and housing as others may be unrealistic, just as 
the Swaziland/Switzerland example illustrates. It is precisely this resource-dependency that is the 
core of these rights’ complexity. How can the content of social rights be determined if it is 
allowed to differ across resource contexts, and how then is it possible to ascertain violations of 
these rights if the content is not determinate? This is what I call the ‘maximum available 
resources dilemma’.7 
 
The dilemma I describe speaks sympathetically to research by other scholars who argue that 
dealing with the resources issue to determine the content of social rights, and assessing where 
along the line between rights to everything and rights to nothing obligations lie, presents the 
biggest challenge to justifying, defining and measuring compliance with social rights. For 
example, in On Human Rights, philosopher James Griffin make the case that the condition of 
maximum available resources, interpreted as “available after proper allocation to other important 
social goals”,8 gives rise to rights that are “next to empty”9 since the phrase gives no guidance as 
to what is required by the duty-bearer. In Thomas Pogge’s edited volume on poverty and human 
rights, Tom Campbell argues that the absence of a systematic mechanism for guiding resource 
redistribution affects “not only the problem of identifying precise human rights obligations … 
but also the prospect of establishing legal claims”.10 These, and other examples,11 serve only to 
highlight the intractability of determining the exact scope of social rights and their corresponding 
obligations. 
 
I argue in this article, however, that there are difficulties involved in dealing with the dilemma 
does not mean that the task is impossible or that it should be abandoned; on the contrary. In 
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setting out to deal meaningfully with the dilemma, the essential challenge rests on developing an 
understanding of how the notion of maximum available resources can be operationalised so that 
it is then possible to arrive at a standard by which a judgement can be made as to when and why 
the identification of a particular unsatisfied social need indeed signals a violation of social rights. 
This article argues that such a challenge is potentially surmountable. But, in so doing, the 
challenger will require multi-disciplinary tools; namely, those from economics. 
 
Whilst a research position that advocates quantitative empirical approaches to normative 
questions about human rights is by no means novel,12 what this research does specifically is go 
beyond the general assertion that empirical methods to normative questions can be useful. What 
it adds to the existing discussion is essentially two things. Firstly, the article provides an 
unravelling of the elusive notion of maximum available resources. And secondly, by turning to 
economics to provide a stylised way of thinking about compliance, it provides a methodological 
sketch for determining the type and standard of social welfare social rights guarantee for 
individuals under resource scarcity and offers a way of signalling the degree to which this 
standard is in fact being met. The argument has four parts. First, Section II sets the scene within 
which social rights are to be analysed and traces their foundations. It is argued that social rights 
are conditioned or limited by relevant normative and practical considerations and it is in allowing 
for these considerations that gives rise to the maximum resources dilemma. Section III outlines a 
strategy for dealing with the dilemma. The strategy proposed is characterised by a two-step 
process. The first step is to define the social welfare-type goods, services and facilities social 
rights guarantee. The second step is to determine, through a valid test, the extent to which this 
level of social welfare is achievable, given duty-bearers’ maximum available resources. In defining 
the type and test, the empirical challenge that remains for dealing with the maximum resources 
dilemma is then to operationalise ‘maximum available resources’. This is the task taken up in 
Section IV. With this description and a strategy in hand, Section V then turns to economics to 
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provide a systematic way of thinking about compliance and dealing with the dilemma. The 
section starts with a brief history of the ways in which compliance has been most commonly 
measured to date, tracing the use of residual analysis in the social sciences more generally, and 
for measuring human rights in particular. It then goes on to outline a conceptual framework and 
empirical strategy, showing how the tools for measuring efficiency in the microeconomic sense13 
can be applied to the measurement of a duty-bearer’s compliance with its obligation to fulfil 
social rights. 
 
II.      THE CASE FOR CONDITIONAL SOCIAL RIGHTS 
According to the contemporary idea of human rights,14 human rights (including social rights) by 
their very nature entail a responsibility upon the duty-bearer to act in some way so that threats to 
fundamental interests are protected against: health, education, housing goods, services and 
facilities be provided for those who need and lack them, for instance.15 The interest-based 
account maintains that it is the extent to which an individual’s interests have an obligation-
generative capacity that elevates human interests to human rights; 16  an idea based on an 
extension of the description of rights given by Joseph Raz, amongst others, to provide a 
description of human rights.17 There is, of course, a vast and divergent literature on the question 
of what is ‘the’ interest that best justifies human rights as human rights.18 I will not devote any 
space to that discussion here. Rather, the challenge set out presently is to unravel what is the 
scope of these rights and obligations. With respect to social rights, this is the crucial question. 
 
I take James Nickel’s definition of human rights to be the most persuasive with respect to how 
human rights are conceptualised in theory and operationalised in practice.19 Nickel offers a 
convincing account of why human rights are minimal standards and why with minimal standards 
come limits. Firstly, human rights should be minimal standards because they should serve to 
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address the severest of problems, the solutions to which should take the highest priority. If 
human rights become more than minimal standards, standards for say promoting the highest 
possible standards of living, almost any unmet social need would become a violation of human 
rights.20 This, echoing John Tasioulas’ warning, could undermine and devalue the whole human 
rights enterprise.21 Secondly, human rights should be minimal standards because they should be 
feasible across space.22 Feasibility in this sense can take various forms. Human rights as more 
than minimal standards may be politically infeasible; they should leave reasonable space for 
national, democratic decision-making and allow for cultural reflexivity with respect to the way in 
which political, legal, economic and social institutions are shaped. 23  They may also be 
economically infeasible; human rights as maximal standards would for many individuals likely 
remain distant dreams,24 which normatively speaking could, in the words of Maurice Cranston, 
“push all talk of human rights out of the clear realm of the morally compelling into the twilight 
world of utopian aspirations”.25 In the case that human rights are more than minimal standards, 
feasibility becomes much less likely. 
 
Minimalism, therefore, not only shapes the nature of the entitlement social rights guarantee, it 
also shapes the nature of the burdens the right will impose, specifically, that the burdens not be 
overly burdensome.26 Indeed, this reality was not lost on those responsible for drafting the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). In an attempt to 
specify claims and obligations pertaining to social rights that are sensitive to the needs and 
interests of both their beneficiaries and their duty-bearers, the resultant Covenant states that 
each state bears the obligation to take steps, with a view to progressively realising the rights 
recognised under the Covenant, subject to the maximum resources that are available.27 This 
language recognises that immediate achievement of the highest standards of health, education 
and housing, for instance, is not what is required of social rights but that instead the duty-bearer 
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has an obligation to make planned and targeted steps towards that goal. It also recognises that 
the pools from which resources can be drawn for realising these rights will vary. 
 
The acts of the duty-bearer will then be conditioned on “additional practical and normative 
considerations”,28 which may serve to alter obligations. According to this scheme, fundamental 
interests then shape the content of social rights, which is subject to further relevant 
considerations. These further relevant considerations then shape the content of the obligations, 
which are now unconditional.29 They are unconditional because other relevant conditions have 
been accounted for in their determination. 
 
The scheme obviously has consequences. It could be argued that making an account of these 
relevant considerations part of the determining-obligations task leaves open the possibility that 
for some duty-bearers the unconditional obligation would be to realise conditional social rights 
to an extent of zero.30 In Onora O’Neill’s view, for example, “a premature rhetoric of rights can 
inflate expectations while masking a lack of claimable entitlements”.31 Whilst this is theoretically 
true (these further considerations could render any level of realisation of these rights overly 
burdensome) it is extremely unlikely within the contemporary idea of human rights, specifically, 
with respect to the importance and minimalist nature of the interests they protect. Nevertheless, 
these relevant considerations could, and would most probably, require that ‘social welfare’ be 
realised to a qualified extent. 
 
The idea of conditionality deals with the problem of burdensomeness and scarcity insomuch as it 
identifies the principles and rules regarding what duty-bearers have to do to fulfil social rights. 
But as David Bilchitz rightly asserts, “ultimately, judgement will be required in translating these 
into particular actions and obligations”.32 The idea of conditionality gives little detail on what 
kind of social welfare these rights guarantee, what share of resources is adequate for satisfying it, 
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or how resources are to be allocated amongst different needs when resources are not sufficient 
to meet them all. It is this incompleteness, yet dependence, which gives rise to the central 
dilemma: how can the content of social rights be determined if resource conditionality allows for 
it to differ across resource contexts, and how then is it possible to ascertain violations of these 
rights if the content is not determinate? 
 
III.   DEALING WITH THE DILEMMA 
If social rights are conditional rights but conditionality gives rise to the maximum available 
resources dilemma, dealing with the dilemma and determining the content of social rights along 
conditional lines must then be approached with a two-step process. The task firstly calls for a 
description of the ‘goods’ an individual requires in order for their fundamental interests to be 
satisfied and since receipt of these goods is conditional it secondly requires a test of whether full 
provision of these goods is possible within the particular community given the prevailing 
contemporary human, social and economic constraints faced. By implication, this is a test of the 
degree to which resource scarcity may justify ‘impossibility’ in cases where there exists a shortfall 
in the provision of the specified goods. Both steps, however, carry with them certain 
complexities. 
 
Taking the first step first, the type of social welfare to which individuals have a right could be 
said to refer to a basket of social goods, services and facilities (from here onwards referred to as 
the welfare basket) that is specified precisely, is conceptually valid and empirically appropriate. 
But the crucial question that immediately follows is: on what basis is the basket’s content 
prescribed? Perhaps it could be left up to duty-bearers themselves to determine the content of 
the welfare basket: the goods, services and facilities prioritised with respect to the particular 
social issues with which each duty-bearer is faced.33 It could be determined with reference to the 
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Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights “minimum core”, which entails “a core 
obligation to ensure the satisfaction of, at the very least, minimum essential levels of the rights 
enunciated in the Covenant”.34 Or, it could be defined empirically, through a technical exercise 
which prioritises those goods, services and facilities deemed most important, which meet the 
most basic of social needs, that can be feasibly scaled-up to population coverage.35 
 
These different methods notwithstanding, in determining the content of the welfare basket there 
is no real need to take sides on which method does the job best. One can be, for present 
purposes, non-partisan since the only requirement of conditional social rights is that an 
assumption as to the kind of social welfare these rights guarantee can indeed be made. The 
basket could be narrowly or expansively defined and, as the foregoing examples suggest, it seems 
there is more than sufficient methodological wind to fill the sails. Taking the second step for 
determining the content of social rights, however, is perhaps more perilous. 
 
In determining the content of human rights, the basic objection to the admittance of resource 
conditionality is that with it comes implicitness that the so-called human, social and economic 
constraints necessarily render full attainment of the welfare basket impossible. According to the 
impossibility objection, ascribing intrinsic resource conditionality to the description of social 
rights inevitably imposes only a “weak”36 duty on the duty-bearer to secure the welfare basket: a 
duty with no immediacy, which reduces these rights to mere rhetoric. But does conditionality 
have to equate to rights-weakness? The many examples of existing and generally accepted rights 
that are, at the same time, conditional (such as the right to freedom of movement, which is 
conditional on good standing and on certain standards of overall safety being met) 
notwithstanding, in the case that the condition be resource-based, such a conclusion is 
dependent on the assumption that there is no valid test for determining whether resources 
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actually are sufficient to secure the welfare basket and as a consequence violations could never 
be adequately ascertained. It could be argued, however, that such an assumption is erroneous.  
 
Although conditionality may appear to imply that resources are always insufficient to realise full 
attainment of the welfare basket, this may not always be the auto-result if a valid test for 
assessing whether maximum available resources are sufficient or insufficient for achieving it can 
be specified. The test would need to give precision to the concept of maximum available 
resources rather than absolve this complex task to the notion of ‘progressive realisation’. It needs 
to be a test of ‘extent’ and could, say, range from 0 (the welfare basket being perfectly 
unaffordable within the given resource set) to 1 (the welfare basket being perfectly affordable). 
As such, the closer the result is to 1, the less incomplete-attainment is justifiable by the condition 
of resource insufficiency. Indeed, whenever the result is equal to 1 any instance of incomplete-
attainment of the welfare basket cannot be justified, which, therefore, would signal some kind of 
violation. 
 
The obligation incumbent on duty-bearers to fulfil social rights does not then, on this account, 
exist as an absolute immovable threshold across resource contexts. Rather, duty-bearers have an 
immediate unconditional obligation to secure the maximum level of the welfare basket that is 
affordable and have a progressive obligation to fully secure it as soon as resources are sufficient 
to do so. If the test is precise enough, conditionality need not preclude the obligation from being 
a “strong”37 immediate one. In defining social rights as rights to a basket of social welfare-type 
goods, the empirical challenge that remains for dealing with the maximum resources dilemma is 
then to operationalise ‘maximum available resources’ so that it is then possible to distinguish 
between those deprivations below full attainment of the welfare basket that exist as a result of 
factors beyond a duty-bearer’s control and those in which the duty-bearer may be a contributing, 
if not causal, factor. 
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IV.    OPERATIONALISING MAXIMUM AVAILABLE RESOURCES 
By now, it is clear that the obligation incumbent on each duty-bearer is determined with 
reference to its ability to fulfil a substantively defined basket of social welfare-type goods given 
its available resources and not according to whether or not it fulfils this basket absolutely. 
Measuring compliance, therefore, requires an understanding of what in fact amounts to ability. 
Which and whose resources are available: are they financial, human, natural, technological? And 
might it be the case that efforts made on the part of the duty-bearer to comply with its 
obligations are a function of factors other than resources? The discussion that follows seeks to 
put flesh on the ability/resources bones in order to identify and set limits to the factors, which 
may facilitate or militate against a duty-bearer in its fulfilment of social rights. 
 
A.         Financial Resources 
It comes as little surprise that the relationship between financial resources and desirable social 
outcomes is a positive one.38 Financial resources are necessary for the provision of all kinds of 
social goods, services and facilities, from the very basic (such as child immunisation and primary 
education) to the more advanced (such as medicines and the recruitment and training of 
specialised teaching staff). They play an important role in determining a duty-bearer’s ability to 
fulfil social rights. 
 
Importantly, in determining maximum available resources, I would argue it is a country’s total 
financial resources that count, not the amount of the national budget it actually spends on social 
goods, services and facilities. Alston and Quinn report several examples from the ICESCR’s 
drafting history instantiating this point.39 For example, it may be the case that two countries with 
the same national income, Y, choose to apportion their financial resources differently. One 
country chooses to devote 10 percent of Y to social welfare-type goods, whilst the other chooses 
to devote only 2 percent. Where assessing a duty-bearer’s social rights performance with respect 
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to its maximum available resources is concerned, the task is not an assessment of what the 
expected level of social welfare attainment should be given the employment of either 10 percent 
or 2 percent of national income. This, as David Bilchitz convincingly argues, would “allow the 
government to avoid realising rights merely by virtue of its allocation of the budget”.40 Rather, it 
is an assessment of whether, with a national income of Y, resources that could in principle be 
allocated for social welfare are sufficient to fulfil the welfare basket, regardless of what is actually 
spent. 
 
The quantum of financial resources considered available must, therefore, be all of those over 
which the duty-bearer has control. Yet this formulation still lacks precision. Whilst it has been 
established that maximum available financial resources refer to the income that has been 
accumulated, which could in principle form part of the national budget, what about those 
resources that could in principle be received from overseas? Since Article 2(1) of the ICESCR 
provides that “Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, individually 
and through international assistance and co-operation … with a view to achieving progressively the full 
realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant”,41 it could be presumed that 
maximum available resources for the fulfilment of social rights are endowed with an 
international dimension as well as a domestic one. For the purposes of operationalising 
maximum available resources, this assumption needs to be examined more closely. If there is an 
international obligation to provide assistance to fulfil social rights,42 what is its nature and scope 
and what implications does it have for determining a duty-bearer’s ability to fulfil the welfare 
basket? 
 
Though the provision in Article 2(1) is one attempt at making the duty of international assistance 
and cooperation a legally binding one,43 its meaning is far from generally accepted.44 This is not 
only the case with reference to the scholarly work that has been done on the use of the phrase as 
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a result of the provision but also with reference to whether, and how, the provision should have 
been articulated in the Covenant in the first place.45 The central difficulty exposed in discussions 
of obligations that travel beyond the state border is determining precisely where these 
obligations begin and end. According to Sigrun Skogly, “it would be neither pertinent, nor 
practical, to imply that all states are responsible for all human rights enjoyment everywhere. 
Rather, there has to be a relatively direct link to activities of the state across borders”.46 
Accordingly, those that dismiss the very existence of international obligations do so on the basis 
that it is nigh impossible to establish causal, moral responsibility between a duty-bearer’s action 
or omission in a foreign territory on the one hand and a violation of an individual’s right living in 
another territory on the other.47  
 
For illustrative purposes, suppose parties (assumed wealthier) have an international obligation to 
provide assistance, to the extent that available resources allow, for fulfilling social rights for 
individuals of other (assumed poorer) parties. Even under the unrealistic simplification that there 
are only two types of parties: one group (group wealthy) that has the resources available to 
provide assistance, and another group (group poor) that requires that assistance if it is to provide 
the welfare basket for its community, still, a “direct link” cannot be attributed. The obligation 
does not reveal precisely what group wealthy ought to do in order to be compliant. Neither does 
it reveal if all members of group wealthy are under an obligation to assist group poor. Likewise it 
does not reveal whether group wealthy ought to assist every member of group poor or only a 
selection, and if only a selection, on what basis the selection be made. This, as Tobin notes in his 
monograph on the right to health, “is a perfect example of an imperfect obligation”.48 
 
Though imperfectness does not wipe international obligations clean of any moral significance 
what it does generate is an obligation with limited strength. An international obligation to 
provide (financial) assistance for the fulfilment of social rights requires only that a duty-bearer 
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“give genuine consideration to its capacity to do so in light of its available resources”,49 which 
along with the sentiments of some states during the drafting of the ICESCR, represents little 
more than a moral vision. Whilst it may be possible, eventually, to specify the content of an 
international obligation,50 grappling with the slipperiness of global social justice is too complex a 
task to be attempted presently. 51  For this reason, it is assumed here that a duty-bearer’s 
maximum available resources are those that are owned and controlled domestically. 
 
Without domestic financial resources there will be little significant advancement in desirable 
social outcomes.52 However, the fact that better social outcomes may not be possible without 
financial resources does not necessarily mean that they are guaranteed if and when more 
financial resources become available. There are many instances where countries with similar 
(low) levels of financial resources have, at the same time, significantly different situations of 
education, hunger, health and housing. For example, whilst Switzerland has both a higher 
income and higher average life expectancy compared with Swaziland, Nicaragua’s income almost 
equals that of Swaziland, yet Nicaraguans can expect to live more than twenty-five years longer.53 
There must be more to maximum available resources than the level of financial resources alone. 
 
B.         The rest of maximum available resources explained 
An explanation of the level of social welfare-type goods each duty-bearer should be able to 
provide requires more than a consideration of only the financial resources available to it. The 
degree of explanation can be, and needs to be, increased by introducing more variables to the 
equation. One important variable is clearly the number, mix, quality and distribution of human 
resources, or so-called human capital. Without a sufficient number of adequately funded and 
trained teachers, health professionals, and engineers it is unlikely that countries would be able to 
meet internationally agreed-upon development goals, address key social issues, or indeed fulfil 
the welfare basket.54 
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Whilst the importance attributed to human capital as a requirement for healthy social systems is 
by no means controversial,55 it may still seem that in an assessment of a duty-bearer’s maximum 
available resources its presence as an additional variable is superfluous. It could instead be argued 
that the availability of financial resources instrumentally captures the duty-bearer’s ability to 
provide human resources also: the more financial resources it has the more teachers, doctors, 
nurses and engineers it is able to recruit, train and employ.56 In a perfectly operating market for 
professional workers, this would indeed be the case; a measure of available financial resources 
would be a good enough proxy. However, the market for professional workers is far from 
perfect. In the arena of health alone, there is an estimated worldwide shortage of almost 4.3 
million doctors, midwives, nurses and support workers and this shortage is felt most acutely in 
countries where these professional workers are needed most: 57  a situation that has been 
described by the World Health Organization as a “global crisis”. 
 
An understanding of the factors that contribute to the shortage is important for explaining 
maximum available resources. The shortage may be due to, for instance, increasing social needs 
or that the economic and social incentives to train, work and live as a professional in certain 
countries are simply not sufficiently strong, often resulting in migration from already resource 
poor countries to more resource abundant countries, coined the brain drain/brain gain.58 In each 
of these cases, or indeed a mixture of both, it would be unrealistic to assume that a duty-bearer’s 
ability to fulfil the welfare basket is a matter of money alone. If a duty-bearer has the financial 
resources to provide access to certain social goods and services, which in principle could satisfy 
fulfilment of the welfare basket, yet despite employing the maximum human resources it has 
available there are still too few professional workers of the appropriate kind to deliver those 
goods and services, it cannot necessarily be expected to fully deliver them in the short to 
medium term. Again, the measure of maximum available resources therefore needs to 
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encapsulate a measure of the human resources that in principle are available. That is, a measure 
of the long-run potential of the duty-bearer’s ability to fulfil the welfare basket. 
 
In operationalising maximum available resources there are many other resources beyond those of 
a financial and human kind that may influence a duty-bearer’s capacity to fulfil the welfare 
basket, some over which it has little to no control. The nature and density of the population, the 
political situation of neighbouring countries, favourability of the physical environment to the 
delivery of social services, to name but a few. If, for instance, countries with highly dispersed 
populations are revealed to have systematically worse social outcomes than would be expected 
given their respective levels of financial and human resources, the inclusion of a variable that 
captures a country’s relative population density would make the target against which the duty-
bearer is measured more sensitive to the geographic realities with which it is faced. However, 
with an explanation of maximum available resources down to its atomic level come some 
obvious practical difficulties. If the measure is to include everything that could potentially 
provide a reason for not doing better, the list of explanatory factors would be unwieldily long. It 
is, therefore, practically necessary to limit the number of explanatory variables to those which are 
most significant. This could be determined theoretically, empirically, or both. 
 
V.       TURNING TO ECONOMICS 
The foregoing discussion has been primarily occupied with dealing with the first part of the 
central dilemma: how can the content of social rights be determined if resource conditionality 
allows for it to differ across resource contexts? In response, I have argued that the content of 
these rights is determined with reference to a substantively defined basket of social welfare-type 
goods, the precise attainment of which is determined with reference to a duty-bearer’s available 
financial resources, human resources and other relevant considerations that are proven 
theoretically and/or empirically significant. I have also argued, however, that the cogency of this 
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scheme is dependent on the availability of a valid test for determining whether maximum 
available resources actually are sufficient to secure the welfare basket and if not to what extent. 
Turning to economics can provide a stylised way of configuring such a test. 
 
A.         Methodological provenance 
In giving specificity to the level of social welfare duty-bearers owe so that ultimately it is possible 
to assess how well duty-bearers are doing with respect to what they owe, quantitative social 
science methods have much to offer. Towards the more advanced end of the methods spectrum 
sits multivariate regression analysis. Regression analysis of the multivariate kind can be used to 
establish the direction, strength and significance of the relationship between an outcome variable 
and two or more explanatory variables.59 For instance, it can provide interesting insight into the 
extent to which national income, the availability of health professionals, geographical and other 
‘random’60 factors individually and/or collectively explain particular social outcomes. In other 
words, it can be used to measure the extent to which maximum available resources explain social 
welfare attainment. Of course, a measure of the degree to which social welfare attainment is 
determined by maximum available resources is valuable in and of itself. But, in the words of 
Nobel Laureate in Economics, Paul Samuelson, “always look back. You may learn something 
from your residuals”.61 
 
In estimating a relationship such as that described above, it is unlikely that resources will explain 
all of the variation in attainment, i.e. very few countries will have social welfare attainment equal 
to the predicted value.62 The residual that is produced by the regression provides information 
with respect to the degree to which the actual level of attainment deviates from the predicted 
value. The residual is the ‘unexplained effect’. Residual analysis is by no means new. Its 
application has a long tradition in the social sciences, from Robert Solow’s treatment of the 
residual in explaining economic growth through technological innovation,63 to Raymond Duvall 
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and Michal Shamir’s propensity of repression indicator developed through regressing sanctions 
on domestic violence.64 Existing efforts that attempt to measure some form of performance with 
respect to human rights standards have not been blind to the virtues of residual analysis either. 
For example, David Cingranelli and David Richards use the regression residual to estimate a 
government’s efforts in fulfilling economic and social rights, (proxied by the Physical Quality of 
Life Index) given a country’s GDP per capita level and whether the country is a signatory and/or 
party to the ICESCR.65 And similarly, in the civil and political realm, Todd Landman, David 
Kernohan and Anita Gohdes regress a measure of a country’s civil and political human rights 
performance on a number of economic, political, and social factors that are commonly 
understood to influence their protection. Then the residual from the regression, the unexplained 
variance, is used as an indicator of “over” or “under” performance with respect to the protection 
of those rights.66 
 
When it comes to measuring performance with social rights standards specifically, probably the 
most innovative and sophisticated method that uses residual analysis for dealing with the 
resources dilemma to date comes in the form of the Index of Social and Economic Rights 
Fulfilment (SERF Index), developed by Sakiko Fukuda-Parr, Terra Lawson-Remer, and Susan 
Randolph.67 The SERF Index measures fulfilment across five economic and social dimensions: 
education, food, health, housing, and decent work. For each of the dimensions, outcome 
indictors are selected to reflect the enjoyment in the interests to which these dimensions relate, 
where this enjoyment is likely to be influenced by government policy. The SERF Index attempts 
to deal not only with the right-holder enjoyment aspect of the task of measuring compliance but 
with the duty-bearer obligation-fulfilment aspect also. Specifically, the innovation in the SERF 
Index methodology lies in its construction of an Achievement Possibility Frontier (APF), which 
specifies each duty-bearer’s obligation with respect to the level of resources it has available. The 
feasible level of rights enjoyment is defined as the maximum level of achievement that has 
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historically been achieved and is set simply by plotting each outcome variable against one input 
variable (GDP per capita, in 2005 $US PPP) across all countries for all years for which data are 
available over a period of roughly a decade,68 and fitting a curve to the maximum boundary 
observations. Then the SERF Index essentially measures the difference between the boundary, 
representing potential achievement, and a country’s actual achievement. That is, the residual. 
 
It has to be acknowledged that this approach was one of the first innovations in bringing 
quantitative methodologies to addressing the resources issue; it does more reasonably link the 
performance expected of a duty-bearer to its level of resource availability (or, to be precise, to its 
level of financial resource availability). Indeed the methodological approach set out in the 
remainder of this article has largely been inspired by it. It does, however, have numerous flaws. 
 
Firstly, the SERF Index methodology provides very little normative account of the indicators 
that characterise social welfare attainment. Whether the indicators that underpin the SERF Index 
have been selected on the basis of a careful qualitative unravelling of human rights concepts or 
instead on the basis of operational ease is not evident. This lack of evidence by itself could 
suggest the latter. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, the SERF Index is methodologically 
too simplistic to deal with the complexities that come with dealing with the resources dilemma 
for the purpose of measuring compliance. To reiterate the argument made earlier, maximum 
available resources are not limited to those of a financial kind. Consider also the heterogeneity of 
the countries included in the analysis. Outliers and statistical noise are likely.69 As a result, setting 
the boundary to the highest level of social welfare historically attained by any country leaves 
open the possibility — even probability — of it being hinged on very few extreme observations, 
with the vast majority of the data in fact lying far below it. This could potentially overestimate 
the degree of cross-country non-compliance to a significant extent. 
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For example, the level of GDP per capita, PPP for Kenya in 2013 is roughly the same as that for 
the Philippines in 1994.70 If it is assumed, for illustrative purposes, that the Philippines attained 
the maximum level of health historically achieved at that given level of GDP per capita, does it 
make sense that Kenya be expected to achieve in 2013 the level achieved by the Philippines in 
1994? Obviously the two countries differ in a number of significant ways. These differences may 
affect the residual, positively or negatively, regardless of the duty-bearer’s action or inaction. The 
level of social welfare that has previously been attained with the same given level of GDP per 
capita may then be too insensitive a target against which to measure compliance. Instead, the 
boundary must be set with a greater degree of methodological sophistication, allowing for the 
entry of multiple explanatory factors and for some sensitivity to statistical noise. The residual 
analysis framework that follows builds on the SERF Index methodology in an attempt to go 
some way to meeting that demand. 
 
B.         Conceptual framework 
The framework that follows borrows from the analytical toolkit of microeconometrics; 
specifically, those tools that are used to estimate production function frontiers. According to 
William Greene, “the frontier production function is an extension of the familiar regression 
model based on the microeconomic premise that a production function …  represents an ideal, 
the maximum output attainable given a set of inputs”.71 With the setting of this ideal comes the 
theoretical proviso that all observations fall below it. As such, estimation of the production 
frontier is generally used as a means to another analytical end: the analysis of technical efficiency. 
Analysis of technical efficiency in the microeconomic sense refers to the degree to which 
producers are successful in allocating the inputs they have at their disposal to produce certain 
outputs in an effort to meet some specified objective. This objective could be to minimise the 
number and level of inputs to produce a given output, (input-approach) or to maximise output 
with a given number and level of inputs (output-approach). By means of estimating the 
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production function a measure of efficiency freely emerges since what it corresponds to is the 
distance between the actual observation and the estimate of the expected ideal.   
 
In the case of measuring the extent to which a duty-bearer is meeting or falling short of the level 
of social welfare it has an obligation to fulfil, the same notion of efficiency can be applied. Each 
duty-bearer can be treated as a decision-making unit that ‘produces’ the welfare basket under the 
behavioural assumption that it operates to maximise attainment of the basket (output) given its 
ability to do so (inputs). Maximum expected attainment at different levels of resource availability 
can then be predicted and it is these expected values that set the obligation frontier. A signal of 
compliance or violation, like efficiency, can then be measured as the difference between 
observed attainment of the welfare basket and the expected level of delivery, or in other words, 
the level states have an unconditional obligation to provide. 
 
Figure 1: Signalling social rights compliance 
 
The standards against which duty-bearers can be measured are provided by the obligation 
frontier in Figure 1. For example, it is expected that for a duty-bearer with a maximum available 
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resources level of a1, attainment of the welfare basket should be at level m1: duty-bearer a1 has an 
unconditional obligation to fulfil m1 level of the welfare basket. Therefore, provision of the 
welfare basket at any point below the frontier, such as m-1, might tell us something about a duty-
bearer’s unwillingness to use its maximum available resources to provide for social welfare and 
could signal a violation of social rights. It might also shed light on the degree to which these 
rights are being violated: that is, the distance between the observed level of welfare basket 
attained and the level set by the obligation frontier, in this example: m-1/(m-1 + m1). 
 
C.         Empirical strategy 
Essentially, there are two main methodologies for measuring efficiency: the mathematical (non-
parametric) approach, and the econometric (parametric) approach. The two techniques have 
both virtues and limitations in their respective bids to envelop data and there is no prescriptive 
rulebook for which method is best.72 Though the technical differences between the two methods 
are many, their relative advantageousness can be assessed with reference to two central 
methodological characteristics: 
i. The econometric approach is parametric so the shape of the frontier has to be 
specified from the very beginning. This could make the model vulnerable to 
functional form misspecification. The mathematical approach, on the other hand, is 
non-parametric so has the advantage that no assumption has to be made as to the 
shape of the frontier. 
ii. The econometric approach is stochastic, which allows for the model to distinguish 
between the effects of inefficiency and the effects of random noise. The 
mathematical approach, however, is deterministic and provides only a general 
measure of inefficiency, which is likely to hide within it random noise, and hence risk 
being either under or overestimated. 
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Deciding when one method should be chosen over the other comes down to an assessment of 
appropriateness to the individual dataset and the research question(s) being asked. Presently, the 
primary objective is to determine the level of welfare basket attainment expected of each duty-
bearer in order to reveal whether this level is in fact being met within and across countries. The 
data involved will be, by nature, highly heterogeneous, of widely differing quality, and will 
therefore likely carry noise. As such, the certain advantages of a model, which allows for real 
non-compliance to be distinguished from random noise must outweigh the potential limitations 
posed by a risk of form misspecification. In this case, proceeding along an econometric path 
would be most prudent.  
 
With this strategy and a description of maximum available resources in hand, both the level of 
social welfare attainment to which individuals have a right and an estimate of how well duty-
bearers are doing with respect to what they owe can be estimated through a basic production 
function of the following simple form:73 
 
where i = 1, … N and t = 1, … T. N is the duty-bearer, T is the year, yit denotes the output 
(welfare basket attainment), X’it is the set of inputs (maximum available resources) and z’I 
captures time invariant heterogeneity across and within countries (population density and 
favourability of the physical environment, for example). Econometric methods allow for the 
disaggregation of the error term into its two components: vit is the random component, which 
represents statistical noise in the production function, and ui in this case represents the signal of 
social rights compliance; it measures the distance between yit and the frontier. Computing this 
model with panel data techniques74 produces duty-bearer-specific estimates of the level of 
welfare basket attainment expected given maximum available resources and duty-bearer-specific 
yit =α + X /itβ + z /iγ + vit − ui
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estimates of the extent to which there is room for potential improvement. The wider the 
deviation from the frontier, the greater is the degree of signalled social rights non-compliance. 
 
VI.    CONCLUSIONS 
It is hoped that this article has been an exercise in stimulating and advancing the discussion on 
how to deal with the maximum resources dilemma inherent in the assessment of social rights 
fulfilment and compliance. It shows that by turning to economics and setting obligations to the 
production frontier, maximum expected social welfare attainment at different levels of resource 
availability can be predicted and that a signal of social rights compliance can be interpreted from 
the difference between the observed level of social welfare attainment and that set by the 
obligation frontier. By virtue of its compliance-revealing property, the econometric methodology 
gives strength to the notion that conditionality need not preclude obligations to fulfil social 
rights from being immediate. 
 
Giving meaning to maximum available resources and testing the degree to which the welfare 
basket is affordable begins to close the hatch through which duty-bearers can escape and 
analysing the variance between expected and actual attainment provides a signal with respect to 
compliance or violation. The methodology does, however, come with a warning. If and when 
operationalised, the estimates produced would be just that: a signal. Analysing the variance 
between observed and expected social welfare attainment may not always reveal the full social 
rights compliance picture. 
 
One admitted limitation of the econometric method described is that it does not capture or 
expose anything with respect to how attainment of the welfare basket is distributed. In the case 
that some individuals are not provided with access to particular social goods, there is no way of 
assessing whether the process for prioritising those individuals for whom these goods are 
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provided over those for whom they are not is non-discriminatory. That non-discrimination is a 
fundamental human rights principle has not gone unacknowledged. Indeed it could potentially 
affect the substantive interpretation as to whether the duty-bearer is compliant or in violation to 
a significant extent. 
 
Recall the scale of 0 to 1 introduced in Section III. When the test reveals full attainment of the 
welfare basket is impossible within the given resource set, (i.e. is <1) it is not sufficient to draw 
full conclusions with respect to compliance or violation from looking at the equivalence, or 
difference, between expected and actual attainment levels only. Rather, the duty-bearer has an 
additional obligation to justify that its reasoning for prioritising the proportion of its community 
for whom the basket has been attained over the proportion for whom it has not, is adequate and 
reasonable. The question of whether a duty-bearer has complied with its obligations under 
impossibility conditions must therefore be examined in light of the means through which the 
result has been produced. For example, who are the excluded; are they women, children, or 
people of a certain ethnicity? Are the individual elements within the welfare basket represented 
fairly or are there some goods, services and/or facilities that are over-represented whilst others 
are completely ignored? If a further assessment reveals that the welfare basket has been provided 
according to sound criteria, the signal of compliance holds. If, on the other hand, the duty-
bearer’s justification for denying access to the welfare basket is deemed unreasonable the signal 
of compliance folds. 
 
Discrimination in social outcomes could be incorporated into the econometric model if it could 
be measured systematically over space and time. However, since discrimination tends to manifest 
along multiple lines: class, race, gender, for example, it is not amenable to capture by a one-
dimensional measure. And even if it was amenable to capture, it is unlikely that sufficiently 
disaggregated data be available to capture it with any validity or reliability. Obviously, the signal 
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of compliance or violation would need further in-country analysis to assess whether it is in fact a 
good measure of social rights fulfilment. But, for now at least, this signal and the methodology 
through which it is produced is a clear move forward over existing approaches that attempt to 
deal with the maximum available resources dilemma. Economics certainly has something to 
offer. 
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